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We construct a monetary model of financial crises that can explain two characteristic 
features of the global financial crisis in 2008/2009, namely, the widespread freeze of 
asset transactions and a sharp contraction in aggregate output. We assume that the 
assets, such as real estate, work as media of exchange on a de facto basis in the goods 
market. In the financial crisis, excessively indebted investors hoard the assets hoping 
for a miraculous rise in their value (risk-shifting behavior), although the asset 
hoarding hinders the assets from working as media of exchange in the goods trading. 
Accordingly, the asset hoarding causes the disappearance of a significant portion of 
broad “money,” which directly results in a contraction in aggregate production. Since 
the root of the problem is an external diseconomy caused by excessive indebtedness 
of investors, fiscal and monetary policies and debt reduction for investors have 
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The global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008/2009 show the following features:
• Freeze of transactions in the asset markets,
• sharp contraction of the aggregate output.
See, for example, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) for the analysis of the global crisis. Diamond
and Rajan (2009) show the risk-shifting eﬀect can explain the ﬁrst feature (i.e., the
market freeze), given exogenous increase in the needs for liquidity. In this paper we
develop a general equilibrium model in which both the ﬁrst and the second features can
be explained. The bottom line of our hypothesis is that this type of ﬁnancial crises is
a disappearance or vaporization from the marketplace of a signiﬁcant portion of broad
“money,” which we vaguely deﬁne as general assets that can be very easily exchanged
with cash so that they work as media of exchange on de facto basis. We formalize
this notion of ﬁnancial crises in our model, in which optimal behaviors of agents cause
the disappearance of media of exchange from the market. Key ingredients are the risk-
shifting eﬀect ` a la Diamond and Rajan caused by risky debt and limited liability, and
the assumption that the assets, such as real estate, work as media of exchange in our
economy. This assumption is a shortcut to formalize the existence in reality of very liquid
asset markets, in which the asset holders can easily obtain cash at anytime by selling the
assets or obtaining loans secured by the assets as collateral. Although we assume in our
model that the assets themselves work as inside money, we may be able to interpret this
assumption as assuming the existence of banks that can issue bank deposits as inside
money, and that the asset holders can easily obtain the deposit money from the banks
by selling the assets or by borrowing collateral-secured loans.
There are three motivations to construct this model. First, we need a theory that
consistently explain the above features of the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008/2009. Our
hypothesis is that disappearance of signiﬁcant portion of inside money may be the key
factor. The second motivation is to provide a uniﬁed framework for policy analysis in
which we are potentially enabled to compare and evaluate the eﬃcacy of the various pol-
2icy responses to the global ﬁnancial crisis, in particular, ﬁscal stimulus, monetary easing
and ﬁnancial stabilization (e.g., capital injections and bad asset disposals), which cru-
cially includes debt reduction of the borrowers. The third motivation is rather technical:
we intend to construct a model of ﬁnancial crises that can be easily embedded in the
standard framework of the neoclassical growth theory and its variants for business cycle
research, i.e., the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. As Aruoba,
Waller and Wright (2007) demonstrate, the Lagos-Wright framework, which our model
builds on, shares its basic structure with the neoclassical growth models so that it can
be easily applied to quantitative business cycle research. In addition, nominal variables
naturally arise and monetary policy issues can be easily analyzed. This feature of our
model may enable us to analyze the (ordinary) business cycles and ﬁnancial crises in a
uniﬁed framework.
1.1 Intuition and a simple example
Intuition is outlined as follows. When an investors who hold, for example, real estate
as their assets are overly indebted, they will choose to hoard their assets hoping for a
miraculous rise in the price because they have nothing more to lose under the limited
liability. While the hoarding of the assets is the optimal behavior for the investors with
limited liability, it may be socially suboptimal and in that case excessive risk is shifted
on the lenders to the investors. This is the market freeze due to the risk-shifting eﬀect
described by Diamond and Rajan (2009), which can be understood as a variant of moral
hazard of overly indebted agents known as the gambling for resurrection in the banking
literature (see, for example, Freixas and Rochet, 2008).
In addition, we assume that the assets are used as media of exchange just like money
in trading of the goods. This assumption corresponds to the existence in reality of
very liquid asset markets, in which the asset holders can sell the assets or obtain loans
secured by the assets as collateral at anytime they want. Instead of formulating a liquid
asset market, we assume for simplicity the asset-in-advance (AIA) constraint, (2), as an
equivalence of the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint in monetary models (see Lucas and
3Stokey, 1987). 1 In this setting, the investors’ hoarding of their assets have a signiﬁcant
external eﬀect through hindering the assets from working as media of exchange in the
goods market. This adverse eﬀect can be translated as a disappearance of some portion
of broad money or as a contraction of demand for the goods, which leads to a shrinkage
of the aggregate output. This is the second feature of the 2008/2009 global ﬁnancial
crisis that we intend to describe in our model.
The following is a simple example that portrays the intuition. It shows that if debt
is large, production and trades do not take place (a ﬁnancial crisis), and that if debt is
small, the goods are produced and traded.
There are two periods: t = 1 (Day) and t = 2 (Night). There are two agents: an
investor and a producer. They are risk neutral and want to maximize their consumption
at t = 2. At t = 1, the investor holds real estate, k = 1, as her asset and debt, L, as her
liability. (We do not specify the lender of L.) The producer can produce the intermediate
goods, q, with the utility cost at t = 1. The utility cost is c(q) = c · q in the unit of the
consumption goods. The investor can buy q in exchange for k in the day market.
At t = 2, new endowment of the intermediate goods, qe, are given to the investor.
In this period, k and Q = q + qe are traded in a perfectly competitive market. The
consumption goods, y, are produced from k and Q by the following technology: y =
Ak1−®Q® + Rk if the boom occurs and y = Ak1−®Q® if the boom does not occur.
The boom occurs with probability ϵ, where ϵ is close to zero. Since the market is
competitive, the price of q in the night market is w = αA(k/Q)1−®, and the price of k is
˜ a = (1−α)A(Q/k)® with probability 1−ϵ and ˜ a = (1−α)A(Q/k)®+R with probability
ϵ. We assume that α > 1/2.
The producer’s optimization problem is to choose q in the day market to maximize
pq − cq, where p is the price of q (in the units of the consumption goods) in the day
market. Assuming that the day market is competitive, we have p = c in equilibrium.
1Although the AIA constraint says that the assets themselves work as inside money, we may be able
to assume alternatively that there exist banks that can issue bank deposits as inside money and the asset
holders can easily obtain the deposit money by selling the assets to the banks or by borrowing bank loans
putting up the assets as collateral.
4The investor’s problem at t = 1 is to choose whether to hoard k = 1 or to buy the
intermediate good, q, in exchange for k in order to solve the following problem:
max
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s.t. cq ≤ E[˜ a]k, (2)
where the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side is the gain from hoarding k and the second
term is the gain from purchasing q in exchange for k, E[·] is the expectation operator,
˜ a is the price of k at t = 2, E[˜ a] is the price of k at t = 1, and [x]+ = x if x ≥ 0 and
[x]+ = 0 if x < 0. Note that the investor is under the limited liability. The constraint
that cq ≤ E[˜ a]k is the asset-in-advance (AIA) constraint in the goods market at t = 1.
















which implies (2) does not bind in the equilibrium where the investor buys q in exchange
for k. This economy has two types of equilibrium depending on the value of L: if L < L,





















e + ϵR] − ϵ[(1 − α)Aq®
e + R].
Proof of the above claim is as follows. First, we show that if L < L, the investors
choose to buy q. We assume and justify that (2) does not bind in the equilibrium where




1−®. The investor buys
q∗ = Q∗ − qe in this equilibrium. Condition (3) implies that cq∗ is strictly smaller than
E[˜ a]k = (1 − α)A(Q∗)® + ϵR. Therefore, it is justiﬁed that (2) does not bind in this
equilibrium. It is easily shown that the investor does not strictly prefer hoarding k to
5purchasing q if and only if L < L. Therefore, the investor is indiﬀerent between hoarding
k and purchasing q in this equilibrium, and they actually buys q∗ = Q∗ − qe.
Second, similarly, the necessary and suﬃcient condition for the investor to strictly
prefer hoarding k to buying q is that ϵ[(1 − α)AQ® + R − L]+ > E[wqs − L + ˜ a[k −
cqs/E[˜ a]]]+, where qs is the solution to maxq E[wq − L + ˜ a[k − cq/E[˜ a]]]+ subject to
cq ≤ E[˜ a]k. Given w = αAq®−1
e and E[˜ a] = (1−α)Aq®
e +ϵR, this condition is equivalent
to L < L < R. In the case where the investor hoards k, the production becomes zero so
that q = 0 and Q = qe.
Note that if 0 ≤ L < min{L,L}, only the equilibrium with q = q∗ exists; and if
max{L,L} < L < R, only the equilibrium with q = 0 exists. Note also that if L < L,
both the equilibrium with q = q∗ and one with q = 0 exist for L < L < L; and if L > L,
there exists no equilibrium for L < L < L.
1.2 Related Literature (to be completed)
The structure of our model is similar to the monetary models by Lucas and Stokey (1987)
and Lagos and Wright (2005). The motivation of our paper is most close to Beaudry and
Lahiri (2009) in that they intend to explain not only collapse in the credit market but also
shrinkage of the aggregate output. In their model, adverse selection due to information
asymmetry on asset quality causes the credit freezes and the output declines. But the
policy implications of Beaudry and Lahiri’s model may be quite diﬀerent from ours
because the ﬁnancial crisis in their model is one of multiple equilibria, the realization of
which solely depends on pessimistic expectations. Shreifer and Vishny (2009) is also close
to our paper in showing that changes in asset prices due to noise traders’ sentiment may
exacerbate real ineﬃciency in investments through securitization and leverage. Their
model may not be appropriate, however, for analyzing and comparing ﬁscal, monetary
and debt-restructuring policies, while our paper tries to provide a uniﬁed framework for
comparing the eﬃcacies of macro and ﬁnancial policies.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we construct a
monetary general equilibrium model in which the example in Section 1.1 is embedded.
6Section 3 provides policy analysis and Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
A key friction in our model is the necessity of media of exchange in the goods market,
which is formulated as a constraint similar to the cash-in-advance constraint in Lucas
and Stokey (1987). The model builds on a simpliﬁed variant of the monetary model
developed by Lagos and Wright (2005). Although Lagos and Wright focus on search
markets, the markets in our economy are competitive, just like in Berentsen, Camera and
Waller (2007), and there are no search frictions. We use the Lagos-Wright framework in
order to analyze the interaction between competing media of exchange, that is, cash and
capital.
2.1 Setup
The model is a closed economy with discrete time that continues from zero to inﬁnity: t =
0,1,2,··· ,+∞. In each date t, there are two competitive markets that open sequentially:
the day market and the night market. There are continua of three types of agents in
this economy: consumers, producers, and investors. The measure of each of the three
agents is normalized to one. There is also a government (or a central bank) that can
provide ﬁat currency and impose tax on the consumers. Consumers are inﬁnitely lived.
Producers are born in the date-t day market and die in the date-t night market after
they consume their proﬁts. Investors are born in the date-(t − 1) night market and die
in the date-t night market after they consume their proﬁts. There are two assets (cash
and capital) and two goods (the intermediate goods and the consumption goods) traded
in this economy. The consumption goods are the numeraire in this economy. All these
assets and goods are divisible. The government injects cash, m, to the consumers in the
night market. The cash is not depletable. Nature endows each consumer with one unit of
capital, k = 1, in the date-(t−1) night market. The producers and the investors have no
endowment when they are born. The capital is used in production of the consumption
7goods in the date-t night market and is completely depleted to zero in the date-t night
market after the production. The producers can produce the intermediate goods, q,
in the day market, incurring the utility cost of c(q) in the units of the consumption
goods, where c′(·) > 0 and c′′(·) ≥ 0. The consumption goods, y, are produced from k
and q in the night market by the following technology which varies depending on the
macroeconomic environment: y = Ak1−®q® + ˜ Rk, where ˜ R is a random variable realized





0 with probability 1 − ˜ ϵ,
R with probability ˜ ϵ.
˜ R is a macroeconomic variable that represents the boom in the night market if ˜ R = R,
and otherwise if R = 0. The probability of the occurrence of the boom ˜ ϵ is also a random





1 with probability 1 − δ,
ϵ (≪ 1) with probability δ.
(4)
This means that the agents in the date-(t−1) night market have the prior that ˜ ϵ = 1 with
probability 1−δ and ˜ ϵ = ϵ with probability δ. Later in this section, we consider the case
of equilibrium with euphoria, in which the economic fundamental is δ = 1, which means
that the boom will come with a very small probability, ϵ, while the agents in date-(t−1)
night market are possessed by euphoria and mistakenly believe the prior that δ is close
to zero: δ = δe (≪ 1). We deﬁne the high state as the state of the day market where
˜ ϵ = 1, and the low state as that where ˜ ϵ = ϵ. We put subscript h on the variables in the
high state and subscript l on those in the low state.
We assume that the night market is a perfectly competitive Walrasian market, in
which there are no frictions or information asymmetry, and that the day market is a
competitive but anonymous market in which trade credit between the sellers and the
buyers of the intermediate goods is not available and payment by “money” is necessary
in trading of the goods. We assume that in the day market, the capital, k, works as a
means of payment as well as cash, m. In other words, we assume that k is an inside
8money in our economy. This assumption is a shortcut to formalize the existence of a
very liquid asset market in which agents who hold k can immediately obtain cash by
selling k or by borrowing (from banks) against k as collateral. (While we assume in
this paper that capital stock itself can work as inside money, we may be able to assume
alternatively as in Kobayashi (2009a) that there exist banks that can issue bank deposits
as inside money and the capital holders can easily obtain the deposit money by selling
the capital stock to the banks or by borrowing bank loans putting up the capital stock
as collateral.)
We assume that the consumers cannot maintain the capital that they are endowed
with properly and the capital will depreciate to zero at the beginning of the date-t day
market if the consumer keeps the capital from the date-(t−1) night market to the date-t
day market. Only the investors can preserve the capital from the date-(t − 1) night to
the date-t day market. Because the investors have nothing to pay in exchange for k in
the date-(t − 1) night market, all they can do is to borrow k from the consumers with
a risky debt contract, in which an investor promises to pay a ﬁxed amount in terms of
the ﬁat currency in the date-t night market, and if she fails to pay the ﬁxed amount,
the consumer obtains all remaining things that the investor possesses in the date-t night
market. It is well known that the risky debt contract is optimal under a certain set of
assumptions on the information structure (see Gale and Hellwig [1985]) and we implicitly
assume that these assumptions hold in our economy. We also assume that although the
goods trading is anonymous in the day market the consumers can trace the borrowers
(the investors) from the date-(t − 1) night market to the date-t night market so that
inter-period debt contract between a consumer and an investor is feasible.
Under the risky debt contract the investors enjoy limited liability, which is the source
of the risk-shifting eﬀect (Diamond and Rajan [2009], Allen and Gale [2000]). In the
date-t day market, the investors choose whether to hoard k until the night market or
to buy the intermediate goods, q, from the producers in exchange for k. In the day
market, the consumers too can buy the intermediate goods by paying cash, m. The
producers produce and sell q to maximize their expected proﬁts. We assume that the
9investors can maintain the capital k from the day market to the night market, and that
the producers can maintain the capital k properly too until the night market, if they
receive it as compensation for q in the day market. On the other hand, the producers
cannot preserve the intermediate goods that they produce in the day market until the
night market, while the investors and the consumers can.
In the date-t night market, k and q are traded competitively and the consumption
goods, y, are produced competitively. The night market is Walrasian, i.e., trade credit
is available for anyone, and there is no need for media of exchange.
2.2 Optimization problem
We ﬁrst consider the producers’ optimization problem. A producer has no endowments
when she is born in the day market and she chooses the amount of the intermediate




pQ − c(Q), (5)
where Q is the amount of the intermediate goods produced and p is the price of Q in
terms of the consumption goods. In equilibrium,
p = c′(Q). (6)
The producer receives pQ in the form of cash or capital. Since as we show in the following
the value of capital in the night market changes depending on whether the boom occurs in
the night market, the amount of the consumption goods the producer ultimately obtains
in the night market also changes depending on whether the boom occurs if she receive
pQ in the form of capital.
The optimization problem for the consumers is similar to that for the representative
agent in Lagos and Wright (2005). In the night market, the consumer’s problem is
W(m,q,d) = max
x;h;m+1;d+1
U(x) − h + βV (m+1,d+1), (7)
10subject to
x + ϕ(m+1 + d+1) = h + wq + ϕm + (1 + i)˜ ωϕd + (γ − 1)ϕMt−1, (8)
where W(·) is the value function at the beginning of the night market, m is cash holdings,
q is the intermediate goods purchased, d is the loan to the investors made in the previous
night market, x is the consumption, h is disutility from labor supply, V (·) is the value
function at the beginning of the day market, β is the discount factor between date-t and
date-(t + 1), ϕ is the value of cash in terms of the consumption goods, w is the price
of q in the night market, and (γ − 1)Mt−1 is the lump-sum injection of cash from the
government. As is standard in the Lagos-Wright framework, the consumer can produce
h units of consumption goods from h units of labor supply, which causes h units of
disutility. Lagos and Wright demonstrated that this quasi-linearity in the consumers’
utility makes the analysis very tractable. The random variable ˜ ω represents the ratio of
the remaining value to the initial value of the loan. In the high state, ˜ ω is revealed in the
day market and ˜ ω = 1. In the low state, ˜ ω is still a random variable in the day market,
which realizes in the night market: ˜ ω = 1 with probability ϵ and ˜ ω = ω with probability
1 − ϵ, where ω is determined as an equilibrium outcome. This problem is reduced to
W(m,q,d) = maxx;m+1;d+1 = U(x) − x − ϕ(m+1 + d+1) + wq + ϕm + (1 + i)˜ ωϕd + (γ −
1)ϕMt−1 + βV (m+1,d+1). The ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) are U′(x) = 1 and
ϕ = βVm(m+1,d+1), (9)
ϕ = βVd(m+1,d+1). (10)
The envelope conditions imply
W(m,q,d) = wq + ϕm + (1 + i)˜ ωϕd + W, (11)
where W is independent of the state variables (m, q and d). In the day market, the
consumer’s problem is
V (m,d) = max
qh;ql
(1 − δ)E[W(m − ϕ−1phqh,qh,d)] + δE[W(m − ϕ−1plql,ql,d)], (12)
11subject to
phqh ≤ ϕm, (13)
plql ≤ ϕm, (14)
where E[·] is the expectation taken in the day market, and ph (pl) is the price of the
intermediate goods in the day market when the economy is in the high (low) state. Con-
ditions (13) and (14) are the cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints. Note that we implicitly
assumed that the government conducts monetary policy such that ϕ takes on the same
value in the high state and in the low state. (We can alternatively assume that ϕh ̸= ϕl,
where ϕh (ϕl) is the value of cash in the night market when the economy is in the high
(low) state. In that case, the government must set the lending rate i in addition to the
growth rate of money supply γ. We discuss this issue later in Section 3.2.) The condition




(1 − δ){whqh − phqh} + δ{wlql − plql} + ϕm + [1 − (1 − ϵ)δ + (1 − ϵ)δω](1 + i)ϕd + V ,
(15)
subject to (13) and (14), where V is independent of the state variables. The FOCs are
(1 − δ)(wh − ph) = phλh, (16)
δ(wl − pl) = plλl, (17)
where λh and λl are the Lagrange multiplier for (13) and (14), respectively. The envelope
conditions are
Vm = ϕ(1 + λh + λl), (18)
Vd = [1 − (1 − ϵ)δ + (1 − ϵ)δω](1 + i)ϕd. (19)
These four conditions together with (9) and (10) imply that
γ
β









= [1 − (1 − ϵ)δ + (1 − ϵ)δω](1 + i), (21)
12where γ = ϕ−1/ϕ is the inﬂation rate or the money growth rate.
The investors are born in the date-(t − 1) night market and borrow k from the con-
sumers with risky debt contract, while they incur the utility cost for asset management,
e(k), to maintain k from the date-(t − 1) night market to the date-t day market, where
e(0) = 0, e′(·) > 0 and e′′(·) > 0. We borrow this setup from Allen and Gale (2000). The
optimization problem for the investors in the date-(t − 1) night market is
max
k
Φ(k) − e(k), (22)
where Φ(k) is the value of holding k units of capital in the date-(t − 1) night, which is
determined by the following optimization problem in the date-t day market:
Φ(k) = max
{
E [˜ ak − (1 + i)ϕbk]+ ,max
qi E
[











pqi ≤ E[˜ a]k, (24)
where (1+i) is the loan rate, b is the nominal price of k in the date-(t−1) night market,
qi is the amount of the intermediate goods the investor purchases, ˜ a is the price of capital
in the night market, and E[˜ a] is the price of capital in the day market. The ﬁrst term
in the right-hand side of (23) is the expected gain from hoarding k and the second term
is the expected gain from buying q in exchange for k. Constraint (24) is the asset-in-
advance (AIA) constraint. The FOC with respect to qi is w = (1 + µ)p, where µ is the
Lagrange multiplier for (24). If 1 + µ = w/p > 1, Φ(k) is reduced to
Φ(k) = max{E[˜ ak − (1 + i)ϕbk]+,[(1 + µ)E[˜ a]k − (1 + i)ϕbk]+}, (25)
and q = E[˜ a]k/p. If the ﬁrst term in the right-hand side of (25) is smaller than or equal
to the second term, the investors in the day market choose to buy qi in exchange for k,
otherwise they choose to hoard k until the night market. Appendix A shows that in the
case where 1+µ = w/p = 1, the reduced form of Φ(k) is still (25) and either qi = 0 or qi
13is indeterminate, that is, the investors’ expected gain is the same for all qi ∈ [0,E[˜ a]k/p].
In the night market, perfect competition in trading of k and q implies





(1 − α)AK1−®Q® with probability 1 − ˜ ϵ,
(1 − α)AK1−®Q® + R with probability ˜ ϵ,
(27)
where K and Q are the total amounts of the capital and the intermediate goods in this
economy, respectively. Note that K = 1. Note also that ˜ ϵ is revealed in the day market.
2.3 Baseline equilibrium
We deﬁne the baseline equilibrium as that with δ = 1 and all agents rationally believe
that δ is 1. This is the equilibrium without euphoria. We assume for parameter values
that
γ > β. (28)
Note that (28) just says that the inﬂation rate (or money growth rate) must be larger
than the consumers’ discount factor. We assume and justify later that there is no default
in equilibrium. Since there is no high state in this equilibrium we omit the subscript l
on the variables. We put subscript b to stand for “baseline” instead. The equilibrium
prices and allocation are determined by the following ﬁve equations for ﬁve unknowns
(pb, Qb, qb, qi
b, ϕb), given γ and m:
pb = c′(Qb), (29)
pbqb = ϕbm, (30)
pbqi
b = (1 − α)AQ®








Qb = qb + qi
b (33)
14The investors purchase the intermediate goods in exchange for k, and the AIA constraint
binds in equilibrium, since (28) and (32) imply that 1 + µ = wb/pb = γ/β > 1. The
investors’ optimization in the date-(t−1) night market is (22) and the FOC with respect
to k at k = 1 implies that






b + ϵR} − e′(1). (34)
Since e′(1) > 0 and the income of the investor is (1 + µ)E[˜ a], there is no default on the
debt (1 + i)ϕb in this equilibrium. Therefore, we have ω = 1, and condition (21) implies
that γ/β = 1 + i, which together with (34) determines i, b, and d = b.
Note that if the government sets γ = β, (28) implies that the monetary friction can
be eliminated and the ﬁrst-best allocation is attained. Thus when there is no euphoria,
the Friedman rule is the optimal policy in this model.
2.4 Financial crisis – equilibrium with euphoria
We describe a ﬁnancial crisis as an outcome of the following equilibrium with euphoria:
Although the economic fundamental is δ = 1, all agents in the date-(t−1) night market
are possessed by euphoria and mistakenly believe that δ is very small; and in the date-t
day market, the value of ˜ ϵ is revealed to be ϵ (≪ 1), despite of the agents’ expectations
that ˜ ϵ would be 1 with large probability. A ﬁnancial crisis corresponds to the state of
the day market in which ˜ ϵ = ϵ. Therefore, in the equilibrium with euphoria, the ﬁnancial
crisis occurs with probability 1 in the date-t day market.2 We can show that if the
agents’ belief δe is less than 1 and R is suﬃciently large, the equilibrium amount of debt,
(1 + i)ϕb, becomes so large that the investors hoard k and do not buy the intermediate
goods in the day market when ˜ ϵ turns out to be ϵ. We assume and justify later that
qi
l = 0 in the low state where ˜ ϵ turns out to be ϵ, and that in the high state wh = ph
2Alternatively, we can think of the ﬁnancial crisis as a bad realization in the rational expectations
equilibrium: Suppose that 0 < δ < 1 and all agents know the true value of δ. In this setting, the ﬁnancial
crisis occurs when ˜ ϵ turns out to be ϵ with probability δ.
15and (24) does not bind. Given the expected value δe, γ, and m, the equilibrium prices
and allocation are determined by the following eight equations for eight unknowns (ph,
pl, Qh, Ql, qh, ql, qi, ϕ):
ph = c′(Qh), (35)
pl = c′(Ql), (36)
phqh = ϕm, (37)
plql = ϕm, (38)








Qh = qh + qi, (41)
Ql = ql. (42)
Equation (39) implies that Qh = Q∗, where Q∗ is deﬁned by c′(Q∗) = αAQ®−1
∗ . The
variables: (1+i), b, ω and d are yet to be determined below. Before that, we should clarify
the condition on parameter values for that the above equilibrium allocation is consistent
with the optimization by the investors. The solution to (25) should be hoarding of k in
the low state and purchase of qi in the high state. A suﬃcient condition for that is









(1 − ˆ ϵ)c′(Ql)
,
where ˆ ϵ ≡ ϵαAQ®−1
l /c′(Ql). Note that the value of the right-hand side of (43) is in-
dependent from R. See Appendix B for the proof. Therefore, we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 We assume that R is suﬃciently large such that (43) is satisﬁed. The
investors hoard capital and do not purchase the intermediate goods in the low state, and
the equilibrium allocation and the equilibrium prices are determined by (35)–(42).
16It is also necessary that qi ≥ 0 for the solutions to (35)–(42) to be the equilibrium
outcome. We can show the following claim.
Claim 1 The solutions to (35)–(42) satisfy qi ≥ 0.
The proof is as as follows. Equations (39) and (40) imply that Ql < Qh = Q∗. On
the other hand, (37) and (38) imply c′(Ql)Ql = c′(Q∗)qh, which imply Ql > qh. Since
Ql < Qh = qh + qi, it is the case that qi > 0. (End of Proof)
The FOC for (22) with respect to k at k = 1 implies that the equilibrium value of
(1 + i)ϕb is determined by
(1 + i)ϕb =
δeϵ{(1 − α)AQ®
l + R} + (1 − δe){(1 − α)AQ®
∗ + R} − e′(1)
1 − δe + δeϵ
. (44)










Given γ, these two equations and (44) determine (1 + i), b, and ω. The amount of loan
for the consumer is simply d = b. For convenience in the next section, we deﬁne the
equilibrium E0 as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The equilibrium E0 is an equilibrium in which a ﬁnancial crisis occurs in
the day market and there is no policy response, which is determined by (35)–(42) and
(44)–(46).
3 Discussion
In our model, a ﬁnancial crisis is described as a plunge of output of the intermediate
goods due to disappearance of media of exchange, that is, capital, which is caused by
hoarding of capital by the debt-ridden investors. Both the contraction of output and
the freeze in asset trading are present in the ﬁnancial crisis in our model, and there are
17causality between these two features. The contraction of the aggregate output is caused
by the freeze in the asset market, which is caused by the risk-shifting behavior (or the
gambling for resurrection) of the debt-ridden investors.
3.1 Welfare loss due to a ﬁnancial crisis
In this model, we formalize a ﬁnancial crisis as an equilibrium realized in the day market
after the agents are possessed by euphoria in the previous night market: A ﬁnancial crisis
is the low state in the day market which is realized with probability δ = 1, while the
agents believed in the previous night market that the low state would be realized with a
very low probability δe (≪ 1) and the investors were overly indebted based on the overly
optimistic expectations. In the ﬁnancial crisis, the investors hoard k and do not purchase
the intermediate goods, leading to a plunge of the output of the intermediate goods in
the day market. We deﬁne the welfare cost due to a ﬁnancial crisis as the gap between
the social surplus in the baseline equilibrium and that in the ﬁnancial crisis. The social
surplus can be deﬁned as the utility gain from consumption of Q for all agents minus
the utility cost of producing Q for the producers. The quasi-linearity of the consumers’
utility and the linearity of the producers’ and the investors’ utilities imply that the
social surplus from production of Q equals AQ®−c(Q). Here, we just compare the social
surplus between the baseline equilibrium and the ﬁnancial crisis and omit any eﬀects of

















where wl/pl = αAQ®−1
l /c′(Ql), wb/pb = αAQ®−1
b /c′(Qb) and Ql is the production in the
ﬁnancial crisis (the low state) and Qb is the production in the baseline equilibrium. Since
αAQ®−1/c′(Q) is decreasing in Q, the above inequality implies that Ql < Qb. Since the
social surplus AQ®−c(Q) is concave and Ql < Qb < Q∗, where Q∗ is the socially optimal
level of production, it is obvious that the ﬁnancial crisis is socially costly. Condition (47)
implies that the social cost of the ﬁnancial crisis becomes larger as δe becomes smaller.
18In other words, our model implies that the cost of a ﬁnancial crisis becomes more severe
as the preceding euphoria is more excessive.
It is also obvious that the ﬁnancial crisis is associated with the lower price of the
intermediate goods than that in the baseline equilibrium. We assume that c′(Q) is
strictly increasing in Q. Since Ql < Qb,
pl = c′(Ql) < c′(Qb) = pb.
3.2 Varying nominal prices and deﬂation
In solving the model, we implicitly assumed that ϕ, the value of money in terms of the
consumption goods, is invariant between the high state and in the low state. We can
relax this assumption so that the value of money becomes ϕh in the high state and ϕl
in the low state, where ϕh ̸= ϕl. We analyze the model with varying ϕ in Appendix C.
As shown in Appendix C, the government has to determine two policy variables because
there are two macroeconomic states that can be realized in the date-t day market. For
example, the government sets the inﬂation rate contingent on the realization of the
high state, γh ≡ ϕ−1/ϕh, and the loan rate, i. The contingent inﬂation rate, γh, is
implicitly determined by setting the money growth rate Mt/Mt−1. By setting γh and
i, the government can set ϕh and ϕl, which in turn determine Qh and Ql. Therefore,
in our model, when the government sets γh and i, it implicitly determines Qh and Ql,
either intentionally or unintentionally. Suppose that the government wants to set the
production in the low state at Ql = Q∗. This targeted level of production is socially
optimal and this is attainable under appropriate parameter values. Note, however, that
attaining Ql = Q∗ through setting γh and i may not be a realistic policy recommendation.
This is because equation (61) implies that if ϕh > β, ϕl = ξϕh must be strictly greater
than ϕh in order to attain Ql = Q∗(= Qh). That ϕl > ϕh seems to correspond to
deﬂationary environment in reality, in which rich people become more rich and buy more
in the ﬁnancial crisis.
193.3 Policy analysis – Equivalence of macro and ﬁnancial policies
In this subsection, we show that under certain conditions the following three policy
options have almost equivalent eﬀects in the ﬁnancial crisis: The policy options concerned
are ﬁscal policy (subsidy to the consumers), monetary policy (liquidity provision to the
investors) and ﬁnancial stabilization (debt reduction for the investors). We assume that
these policies can be undertaken in the day market, in which the economy falls into
the ﬁnancial crisis. We compare the equilibria in which respective policies are perfectly
foreseen before the crisis.
3.3.1 Fiscal policy
We deﬁne the ﬁscal policy as giving subsidy (cash) to the consumers, which is ﬁnanced
later in the night market by a lump-sum tax on the consumers. We assume as a crucial
assumption that there is an upper limit for the nominal amount of the subsidy, M.
This upper limit is exogenously given by some political or technological constraints. We
consider the equilibrium in which all agents in the date-(t−1) night market expect that
the government would undertake the above ﬁscal policy in the date-t day market if the
economy fall into the ﬁnancial crisis. In this equilibrium, the CIA constraint for the
consumers changes from (38) to
plql = ϕ(m + M). (48)
The equilibrium with ﬁscal policy, Ef, is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 2 The equilibrium Ef is an equilibrium in which a ﬁnancial crisis occurs in
the day market and the government responds to the crisis by the ﬁscal policy, which is
determined by (35)–(37), (39)–(42), (44)–(46), and (48).
Comparing E0 and Ef, we can easily show from equation (40) that the aggregate pro-
duction, Ql, is the same for both equilibria, and that the consumption proﬁle and labor
supply of the agents are also the same for both equilibria. Therefore, the social welfare
in Ef is equal to that in E0. We can interpret this result as the ineﬀectiveness of the
20ﬁscal policy in the case when the policy response is perfectly foreseen before the crisis
occurs. Alternatively, it can be said that if the ﬁscal policy is not perfectly foreseen by
the agents beforehand, the ﬁscal policy is eﬀective to increase the aggregate production
in the day market. Note that the eﬀectiveness of the ﬁscal policy comes from the fact
that the government subsidy loosens the CIA constraint for the consumers and therefore
the ﬁscal policy is eﬀective even though the Ricardian equivalence precisely holds in this
model. Note that since R is very large and satisfy (43), the debt-ridden investors never
choose to buy the intermediate goods for any level of aggregate production, Ql (≤ Q∗).
3.3.2 Monetary Policy (liquidity provision)
We deﬁne the liquidity provision during a ﬁnancial crisis as follows: the government issue
new cash and lends cash to the debt-ridden investors for purchasing the intermediate
goods. The government loans to the investors are secured by the collateral k, with the
gross (nominal) interest rate of 1. (There are arbitrariness in the choice of the interest
rate of the government loans. We set it at 1 so that there is no resource transfer to
the government sector.) The government loans must be repaid in the night market and
are senior debts that are prior to the existing loans from the consumers. The investors
can hoard the cash they borrow from the government or use the cash to purchase the
intermediate goods, and repay the government loans in the night market. Although the
investors are ultimately insolvent unless the boom occurs ( ˜ R = R), they weakly prefer
purchasing q to hoarding cash as long as w ≥ p. We consider the equilibrium in which
all agents in the date-(t − 1) night market expect that the government would undertake
the above monetary policy in the date-t day market if the economy fall into the ﬁnancial
crisis. In this equilibrium, the aggregate production in the low state is determined by
Ql = ql + ˆ qi, (49)
instead of equation (42), where
plˆ qi = (1 − α)AQ®
l + ϵR. (50)
The equilibrium with monetary policy, Em, is deﬁned as follows:
21Deﬁnition 3 The equilibrium Em is an equilibrium in which a ﬁnancial crisis occurs in
the day market and the government responds to the crisis by the monetary policy, which
is determined by (35)–(41), (44)–(46), (49), and (50).
There is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of Em, which is
c′(Ql)Ql > (1 − α)AQ®
l + ϵR, (51)
where Ql is determined by (40).3 The suﬃcient condition for (51) is c′(Ql)Ql ≤ (1 −
α)AQ®










This condition implies that if the agents believe that a ﬁnancial crisis occurs with not-
so-small probability, δe, there exists a monetary equilibrium in which the government
undertake the monetary policy in the ﬁnancial crisis. (Note that the same logic as that
in Claim 1 implies that qh and qi are both strictly positive in the high state.)
It is easily shown from (40) that Ql in Em is equal to that in E0. Since we assume
that the repayment of the government debt is plˆ qi, equations (44) and (46) change to
(1 + i)ϕb =
δeϵ{(1 − α)AQ®
l + R + (wl − pl)E[˜ al]/pl} + (1 − δe){(1 − α)AQ®
∗ + R} − e′(1)





l + (wl − pl)E[˜ al]/pl
(1 + i)ϕb
, (54)
respectively. There are slight diﬀerence in consumption proﬁle and labor supply between
Em and E0. The consumption of the investors becomes (1−α)AQ®
l +R+(wl−pl)E[˜ al]/pl
when ˜ R = R in Em, while it is (1−α)AQ®
l +R when ˜ R = R in E0. But this diﬀerence is
oﬀset by the diﬀerence in labor supply, h, by the consumer in the night market because
3If c
′(Ql)Ql · (1 ¡ α)AQ
®
l + ϵR for Ql determined by (40), cash has no value in the equilibrium:
ϕ = qh = ql = 0. The aggregate production, Q, in this case is not determined by (40), but Q is determined
by c
′(Q)Q = (1 ¡ α)AQ
® + ϵR. (40) is no longer an equilibrium condition since ϕ = 0. To make the
equilibrium with ϕ = 0 exist, we need additional assumption that the government can provide loans in
the real term and the real loans can be used as media of exchange.
22of the linearity of the utilities of the agents. Therefore, the social welfare in Em is
equal to that in E0. We can interpret this result as the ineﬀectiveness of the monetary
policy in the case when the policy response is perfectly foreseen before the crisis occurs.
Alternatively, it can be said that if the monetary policy is not perfectly foreseen by the
agents beforehand, the monetary policy is eﬀective to increase the aggregate production
in the day market.
We made a strong assumption to derive the eﬀectiveness of the monetary policy. It is
that the loans from the government have perfect seniority over the loans from consumers,
which is not plausible in the real world. If the government seniority is incomplete,
the government incurs a signiﬁcant loss that should be tax ﬁnanced. In this case, the
monetary policy reduces to a ﬁscal policy. 4
3.3.3 Debt reduction
We deﬁne the debt reduction policy as reduction of the investors’ debt from (1+i)ϕbk to
(1+i)ϕb′k, which is a suﬃciently small amount such that the investors never default on
the debt for all realization of ˜ R no matter whether they hoard the capital or purchase the
intermediate goods. In this case, the investors choose to purchase the intermediate goods
in the low state rather than to hoard the capital as long as w ≥ p. The government can
implement the debt reduction by just nullifying the debt obligation of the investors par-
tially such that the remaining debt becomes (1+i)ϕb′k. This policy may be regarded as
a simpliﬁcation of bank closure policy through deposit cut.5 We consider the equilibrium
in which all agents in the date-(t − 1) night market expect that the government would
undertake the debt reduction policy in the date-t day market if the economy fall into
the ﬁnancial crisis. In this equilibrium, the production in the low state satisﬁes (49) and
4If we explicitly introduce the banking sector in this model, we could have the “credit trap” in which
the bank lending to the insolvent investors do not increase even thought the government (or the central
bank) injects base money into the banking sector and the banks hoard the injected cash. Monetary policy
becomes ineﬀective in this situation. See Benmerech and Bergman (2009) for a model of credit trap.
5Alternatively, the government can give subsidy (1 + i)ϕ(b ¡ b
′)k to the investors in the date-t night
market, while the subsidy is ﬁnanced by a lump-sum tax on the consumers.
23(50). Therefore, the equilibrium allocation is determined by (35)–(41), (49) and (50).
The aggregate production in the low state, Ql, is determined by (40), and therefore it is
the same as that in E0. There is some arbitrariness in the amount of the debt reduction.
We set a suﬃciently small amount for b′, which the investors never default on as follows:
(1 + i)ϕb′ = (1 − α)AQ®
l , (55)
where ϕ and Ql are determined by (35)–(41), (49) and (50), and i is yet to be determined.
Given the expectations that the debt reduced in the ﬁnancial crisis, the gain for the
investors of holding k in the date-(t − 1) night market is
Φ(k) = (1 − δe)[(1 + µh)E[˜ ah]k − (1 + i)ϕbk] + δe[(1 + µl)E[˜ al]k(1 + i)ϕb′k], (56)
where (1 + µ)E[˜ a] =
®AQ®−1
c′(Q) [(1 − α)AQ® + ϵR] for Q = Qh,Ql. The FOC for (22) with
respect to k at k = 1 implies that
(1 + i)ϕb = (1 + µh)E[˜ ah] +
δe
1 − δe[(1 + µl)E[˜ al] − (1 + i)ϕb′] −
e′(1)
1 − δe. (57)
Since the debt reduction occurs in the low state, (19) changes to Vd = [1−δe +δeω](1+
i)ϕd, and therefore, (45) and (46) change to
γ
β
= [1 − δe + δeω](1 + i), (58)
ω = b′/b. (59)
Therefore, the equilibrium with debt reduction policy, Ed, is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 4 The equilibrium Ed is an equilibrium in which a ﬁnancial crisis occurs in
the day market and the government responds to the crisis by the debt reduction policy,
which is determined by (35)–(41), (49), (50), (55) and (57)–(59).
As is similar to the case of Em, parameters must satisfy the condition (51) and (52) for
Ed to exist. As stated above, the aggregate production, Ql, is the same for both E0 and
Ed. The social welfare is also the same in both equilibria.6 We can interpret this result
6There are slight diﬀerence in consumption proﬁle and labor supply between the two equilibria. The
consumption of the investors becomes strictly positive even when ˜ R = 0 in Ed, while it is zero in E0.
But this diﬀerence is oﬀset by the diﬀerence in labor supply, h, by the consumer in the night market
because of the linearity of the utilities of the agents.
24as the ineﬀectiveness of the debt reduction policy in the case when the policy response is
perfectly foreseen before the crisis occurs. Alternatively, it can be said that if the debt
reduction policy is not perfectly foreseen by the agents beforehand, the debt reduction
is eﬀective to increase the aggregate production in the day market. The eﬀectiveness of
the debt reduction comes from the fact that this policy eradicates the negative macroe-
conomic externality that the large debt burden of the investors exerts, that is, the large
debt makes the almost insolvent investors hoard their capital as a result of their rational
choice, while the hoarding of capital causes an unintentional reduction of the media of
exchange in the goods market.
The debt reduction is equivalent to a lump-sum transfer from the consumers to the
investors. If the lump-sum transfer is not available, the tax distortion associated with
this policy may be large.
4 Conclusion
Our experience of the global ﬁnancial crisis in 2008/2009 indicates that we should for-
malize a major ﬁnancial crisis as an event associated with
• freeze of transactions in the asset markets,
• sharp contraction of the aggregate output.
Our interpretation of this type of ﬁnancial crises is a disappearance or vaporization from
the marketplace of a signiﬁcant portion of broad “money,” which we vaguely deﬁne as
general assets that can be very easily exchanged with cash so that they work as media
of exchange on de facto basis. We formalized this notion of ﬁnancial crises in our model,
where optimal behaviors of agents under risky debt contract and limited liability cause
the disappearance of media of exchange from the market. Market freeze is known to
be explained by the risk-shifting eﬀect (Diamond and Rajan, 2009): If the asset holders
with limited liability are excessively indebted, they choose to hoard the assets waiting
for a miraculous rise in their values. Asset hoarding that causes the market freeze can
be understood as a risk-shifting behavior of debt-ridden investors. If the assets are used
25as media of exchange in the goods market, the risk-shifting behavior exerts a signiﬁcant
externality that overly decreases the aggregate production. Our notion that the assets,
such as real estates, are used as de facto money is a simpliﬁcation of the reality in which
the asset holders can obtain cash at any time by selling the assets or by borrowing money
by putting up the assets as collateral. In the economy where the assets work as media
of exchange, hoarding of the assets is translated as disappearance of signiﬁcant portion
of the broad money, which directly causes contraction of the aggregate output.7
Our model features the externality of debt overhang (Lamont 1995) that causes a
sharp contraction of the aggregate output. It was shown that to eradicate this exter-
nality, macroeconomic policies, i.e., ﬁscal and monetary policies, and ﬁnancial policy (or
debt reduction of excessively indebted agents) have almost equivalent eﬀect. Therefore,
this externality may justify a government policy that facilitates debt reduction during
a ﬁnancial crisis. A possible policy scheme may be to make the bankruptcy procedure
contingent on the occurrence of a ﬁnancial crisis (the crisis-contingent bankruptcy pro-
cedure). Debt reduction through the bankruptcy procedure should be quick and drastic
during a ﬁnancial crisis in order to eradicate the adverse external eﬀect. For example,
we may provide the procedure in which the government has the right, which becomes ef-
fective only during a ﬁnancial crisis, to urge borrowers (or lenders) to ﬁle for bankruptcy
if their debts exceed a certain threshold. After the global ﬁnancial crisis, economists
and policy makers enthusiastically argue for a new architecture of ﬁnancial regulation,
namely, macroprudential regulation (see Borio [2003], Brunnermeier et al. [2009]). The
macroprudential regulation is ﬁnancial regulation that varies contingent on changes in
macroeconomic environment. Our notion of crisis-contingent bankruptcy procedure may
form a pair with macroprudential ﬁnancial regulation. Both seeks varying regulations
contingent on macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, while the latter is for lenders’ ﬁnancial health
and the former is for borrowers’ debt reduction.
7In the companion paper, Kobayashi (2009), we formalize bank runs as a disappearance of broad
money. In that paper, bank deposits work as a medium of exchange in the normal times, whereas when
a crisis occurs a signiﬁcant portion of bank deposits become frozen as a result of the bank runs and the
output shrinks.
26A lesson from the global ﬁnancial crisis must be at least that we need to pay more
attention to the adverse eﬀects on macroeconomic performance caused by excessive debts
in the private sector, which necessarily accumulate before and during a ﬁnancial crisis.
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A The investor’s optimization when w = p
We show the investor’s optimization in the date-t day market is (25) even in the case
where 1 + µ = w/p = 1. Note that if ˜ ϵ = 1, it is obvious from ˜ a = E[˜ a] that (25) holds
and qi is indeterminate. So we focus on the low state where ˜ ϵ = ϵ (≪ 1). For brevity
we deﬁne π(qi
∗) = maxqi E[˜ π(qi)]+, where qi
∗ is the solution to the maximization of the






. There are three cases that
we should consider: (1) a case in which ˜ π(qi
∗) < 0 only when ˜ R = 0; (2) a case in which
˜ π(qi
∗) < 0 only when ˜ R = R; and (3) a case in which ˜ π(qi
∗) ≥ 0 regardless of the realized








pq + {(1 − α)AQ® + R}k − (1 + i)ϕbk
}
. Since E[˜ a] = (1 −
α)AQ® + ϵR < (1 − α)AQ® + R, the solution should be qi
∗ = 0 and π(0) = E[ak −








pq + {(1 − α)AQ® + R}k − (1 + i)ϕbk
}
.
Since E[˜ a] = (1−α)AQ® +ϵR > (1−α)AQ®, the solution should be qi
∗ = E[˜ a]k/p. But
then ˜ π(qi
∗) takes on the same value regardless of the realized value of ˜ R, meaning that
˜ π(qi
∗) > 0 when ˜ R = R, which is a contradiction. Therefore, case (2) never happens.
Case (3) is divided into the following two cases: (3-1) a case in which qi
∗ = E[˜ a]k/p; and
(3-2) a case in which qi
∗ < E[˜ a]k/p. In general, however, case (3-1) cannot happen in
equilibrium. Since Q = q+qi
∗, where Q is the total supply of the intermediate goods and
q is the amount purchased by the consumers, w = p implies αA(q + qi
∗)®−1 = c′(q + qi
∗),
which uniquely determines qi
∗, given q. The condition qi




∗), which is not compatible with w = p in general.












E[a]k − (1 + i)ϕbk. Since π(qi
∗) takes on the same value for all qi
∗ ∈ [0,E[˜ a]k/p], qi
∗ is
indeterminate. The analysis of cases (1) and (3-2) implies that Φ(k) is determined by
(25) and either qi
∗ = 0 or qi
∗ is indeterminate in equilibrium.
B Condition for hoarding of capital
In this appendix we prove that (43) is a suﬃcient condition for that the investors hoard
k in the low state and purchase qi in the high state and that the equilibrium prices
and allocation are determined by (35)–(42). Proof is by contradiction. Suppose that
the investors purchase qi and do not hoard k in the low state. In this case the gain for
the investors from purchasing the intermediate goods should be
wl
pl El[˜ a] in the low state.
29Therefore, the FOC for (22) with respect to k at k = 1 implies
(1 + i)ϕb = δewl
pl
El[˜ a] + (1 − δe){(1 − α)AQ®
∗ + R} − e′(1). (60)
The assumption that R > R implies that wl
pl El[˜ a]−(1+i)ϕb < 0 if(1+i)ϕb is determined
by (60). Thus the investors hoard capital in this case. This is a contradiction. Therefore,
(1 + i)ϕb is determined by (44) and the investors hoard capital in the low state. It is
easily shown that (1 − α)AQ®
∗ + R − (1 + i)ϕb > 0 and the investors actually buy the
intermediate goods in the high state. The assumption that R > c′(Q∗)qi − (1 − α)AQ®
∗
implies that the AIA constraint (24) does not bind in the high state.
C Generalized model with varying value of money
In the text, we assumed that the value of ϕ is equal in the high state and in the low
state. Under this constraint, it has been shown in the text that the loan rate, i, is
uniquely determined as an equilibrium outcome. Generally, we can relax this constraint
and assume that the value of money is ϕh in the high state and ϕl in the low state,
where ϕh may not be equal to ϕl. We can solve the model allowing that ϕh ̸= ϕl.









c′(Qh)qh = ϕhm, (62)
c′(Ql)Ql = ξϕhm, (63)
c′(Qh) = αAQ®−1
h , (64)
Qh = qh + qi, (65)
γh
β




(1 + i)ϕhb =
δeϵ{(1 − α)AQ®
l + R} + (1 − δe)
®AQ®−1
h
c′(Qh) {(1 − α)AQ®
h + R} − e′(1)
δeξϵ + 1 − δe . (67)
This is a set of seven equations, which include nine variables: γh, ϕh, ξ, Qh, Ql, qh, qi, i,
and ϕhb. Therefore, the government (or the central bank) should set two variables to pin
30down the equilibrium uniquely. What the government can set are ϕh, through setting
the quantity of money supply, and i. If the government sets γh and i appropriately, the
government can control productions, Qh and Ql, at least to some extent. (In the text
we implicitly assumed that the government chooses the value of i such that ξ = 1.)
Note, however, that this generalized model has a peculiar implication: ϕl > ϕh is
desirable, meaning that deﬂation is desirable during a ﬁnancial crisis. For example,
suppose that the government wants to set Ql at Q∗ (= Qh), which is the socially optimal
level of production. In this case, (61) implies that ξ must be greater than 1, if Ql = Q∗.
In other words, the necessary condition for Ql = Q∗ is ϕl > ϕh, which is deﬂation during
a ﬁnancial crisis.
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